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Título: Una respuesta meta-analítica a la crisis de confianza de la psicolo-
gía. 
Resumen: El meta-análisis es una metodología firmemente establecida y 
una parte integral del proceso de generación de conocimiento en las cien-
cias empíricas. El meta-análisis también se ha centrado en la metodología y 
se ha convertido en uno de los principales críticos de las deficiencias me-
todológicas. Destacamos varios puntos problemáticos sobre cómo investi-
gamos en psicología: exceso de heterogeneidad en los resultados y dificul-
tades para la replicación, sesgo de publicación, calidad metodológica sub-
óptima y prácticas cuestionables de los investigadores. Estos y otros pro-
blemas condujeron a una "crisis de confianza" en psicología. Discutimos 
cómo la perspectiva meta-analítica y sus procedimientos pueden ayudar a 
afrontar la crisis. Una perspectiva más cooperativa, en lugar de competiti-
va, puede ayudar a cambiar para que consideremos la replicación como una 
contribución más valiosa. El conocimiento no puede basarse en estudios 
aislados. Dada la naturaleza del objeto de estudio de la psicología la unidad 
natural para generar conocimiento debe ser la distribución estimada del 
tamaño del efecto, no la decisión dicotómica sobre la significación estadís-
tica en estudios específicos. Se ofrecen algunas sugerencias sobre cómo re-
dirigir la investigación y las prácticas de los investigadores, de modo que 
sus intereses personales y los de la ciencia en sí estén más alineados. 
Palabras clave: meta-análisis; crisis de confianza; tamaño del efecto; prác-
ticas cuestionables. 
  Abstract: Meta-analysis is a firmly established methodology and an inte-
gral part of the process of generating knowledge across the empirical sci-
ences. Meta-analysis has also focused on methodology and has become a 
dominant critic of methodological shortcomings. We highlight several 
problematic issues on how we research in psychology: excess of heteroge-
neity in the results and difficulties for replication, publication bias, subop-
timal methodological quality, and questionable practices of the researchers. 
These and other problems led to a “crisis of confidence” in psychology. 
We discuss how the meta-analytical perspective and its procedures can 
help to overcome the crisis. A more cooperative perspective, instead of a 
competitive one, can shift to consider replication as a more valuable con-
tribution. Knowledge cannot be based in isolated studies. Given the nature 
of the object of study of psychology, the natural unit to generate 
knowledge must be the estimated distribution of the effect sizes, not the 
dichotomous decision on statistical significance in specific studies. We 
make some suggestions on how to redirect the research and the research-
ers' practices, so that their personal interests and those of science as such 
are better aligned. 
Keywords: meta-analysis; crisis of confidence; effect size; questionable 
practices. 
 
Introduction 
 
Meta-analysis arose from the need for a rigorous and sys-
tematic review of a body of scientific evidence. The objective 
assumed in its development was to propose methods for the 
synthesis of evidence while dealing with any heterogeneity of 
the effects (Botella & Sánchez-Meca, 2015; Cooper, Hedges 
& Valentine, 2009; Glass, 1976). Although it originated in the 
social sciences, halfway between education and psychology, 
its use has spread to practically all empirical sciences. We can 
say that nowadays it is a firmly established methodology and 
an integral part of the process of generating knowledge. 
Let us examine the use of meta-analysis through some 
data from the field of educational psychology. We will take 
as reference the five journals with the highest impact factor 
in Journal Citation Reports in 2017 within the category "Psy-
chology, Educational"1.2In the volumes corresponding to 
that year, those journals published 357 articles, of which 252 
are empirical studies, 11 are meta-analytic reviews (3.1%) and 
the rest are other types. That is, there is a ratio of 23:1 be-
tween the primary empirical studies and the meta-analyses. If 
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we look back, to what happened with the journals of the five 
highest positions in the same category 20 years before 
(19972)3we observe the following: 241 published articles, of 
which 186 were primary empirical studies, 2 were meta-
analysis (0.8%) and the rest were other types. The ratio be-
tween primary studies and meta-analysis was 93:1. The pres-
ence of meta-analysis among the journals with the greatest 
impact has grown substantially. Meta-analysis serves very of-
ten as the base of empirical arguments repeated frequently. 
The data that seem most revealing about the trends de-
rived from the consolidation of the meta-analysis is that of 
those 186 primary studies one third (34.4%; 64/186) have 
subsequently served as a primary source in some meta-
analysis. Many of them in more than one. That is, today it is 
quite frequent (in some areas it is almost routine) that re-
search provides not only the evidence primarily analyzed by 
the authors who have generated it, but end up integrated into 
some subsequent synthesis. That is why when we publish 
primary studies we should think not only about how our col-
leagues will receive and value our results and about how they 
can contribute in a singular way to the advancement of 
knowledge. We should also think in that the results will be a 
piece of a larger theoretical understanding of phenomena 
based on the evidence provided by many others. 
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A meta-analytical response to the crisis of confidence of psychology                                                                                  351 
 
anales de psicología / annals of psychology, 2019, vol. 35, nº 2 (may) 
The original objectives of meta-analysis remain valid, and 
in fact have been normalized in most sciences. However, 
great changes usually bring unforeseen consequences. The 
appearance of meta-analysis and its progressive incorpora-
tion into normal science has served as a catalyst for the eval-
uation of our methodology. It is not a coincidence that meta-
analysis was developed from research traditions in the inter-
section of psychology and education (Botella & Gambara, 
2006). These research areas maintain strong internal debates 
about their epistemology and research methods. As we will 
see, the perspectives provided by meta-analysis led to a focus 
on methodology. On many occasions, meta-analyses found 
unexpected, scattered, inconsistent, and even contradictory 
results in the primary studies (Botella & Eriksen, 1991). 
These results can obviously be related to the way in which 
the meta-analyses are carried out. As in the case of primary 
studies, some meta-analyses may also show inconsistent re-
sults due to reproducibility deficits in the procedure used to 
collect and process the information, as some recent studies 
have pointed out (Gøtzsche, Hróbjartsson, Marić, & Tendal, 
2007). However, in addition to the difficulties of having such 
a complex object of study as human behavior, the question 
was inevitably asked whether these results were because we 
have developed models and theories of insufficient power. 
Perhaps the lack of control of relevant environmental and 
genetic variables has led to a focus on irrelevant and non-
explanatory variables, leading to explanations based in part 
on mere methodological artifacts or circumstances beyond 
the relevant scientific domains. 
Many meta-analyses that currently published are not lim-
ited to the combined estimates of the effect size and the 
analysis of potentially moderating variables. They also add 
other analyses related to variables outside the substantive is-
sues under study (e.g., Quiles-Marcos, Quiles-Sebastián, 
Pamies-Aubalat, Botella, & Treasure, 2013). Step-by-step, the 
idea is growing that meta-analytic tools can be useful for the 
study and analysis of our basic scientific practices them-
selves. One intended purpose is to determine the degree to 
which the observed heterogeneity in the results is genuine 
(even though it is a consequence of moderation effects not 
yet identified) and to which degree it is due to factors exter-
nal to what is being studied, especially the practices of the 
scientists themselves. 
Once we entered the 21st century, psychology (or at least 
some of its main fields) has become immersed in a severe 
crisis, visible in multiple publications and conferences, which 
has been identified as a "crisis of confidence". The main idea 
that we want to convey in the present article is that one way 
to address this crisis and lead to a positive outcome is to ap-
ply the meta-analysis perspective, extending its methods and 
its way of understanding science to the various fields of psy-
chology. Thanks to the fact that meta-analysis focuses on 
methodology and has become a dominant critic of methodo-
logical shortcomings, it can offer very useful tools to face the 
crisis. 
 
A science of science: How we do research 
 
Researchers assume the postulates of scientific methods. We 
have many sources with guidelines, protocols, technologies 
and many practical tools and resources where we can learn 
how to carry out correct and efficient scientific research. 
Certainly, we continue to debate and discuss the facets that 
can be improved, but that does not mean that there are not 
clear evaluative criteria. However, what the results of some 
meta-analyses tell us is that research methods are not always 
correctly implemented and that external factors that strongly 
affect the final results are frequently involved. We can say 
that we already have some guidelines, derived from episte-
mology, on how to make correct and credible scientific ad-
vances, but now we observe that they are not always imple-
mented, and such breaches have negative consequences. We 
are concerned with collecting and organizing relevant empir-
ical evidence regarding how research is actually being done. 
The great heterogeneity sometimes observed in the results 
has raised many doubts about the robustness of the method-
ology. 
One of the first victims has been the null hypotheses 
testing, once a ubiquitous tool that was now being ques-
tioned (Cumming, 2012, 2014, Frick, 1996, Gigerenzer, 1993, 
Harlow, Mulaik, & Steiger, 1997; Nickerson, 2000; Tryon, 
2001). The fact that meta-analysis typically begins with esti-
mates of effect size provided by the primary studies, and not 
its dichotomous decision on statistical significance, is slowly 
leading to undermine the influence of p values. For a meta-
analyst, this is trivial, since we rarely are interested in wheth-
er the primary studies showed statistically significant effects. 
That detail is not usually relevant to our objectives. Un-
doubtedly, hypotheses testing continues to predominate in 
primary studies, but it is no longer as decisive in theoretical 
arguments. Meta-analysis shows that a typical body of evi-
dence includes independent estimates in which the result is 
not significant with respect to the null hypothesis. In fact, it 
is rare that there is statistical significance in all the primary 
studies. It is the combined studies and the combined evi-
dence that provide us with a realistic and credible picture. In 
the context of meta-analysis, we do not consider a non-
significant result as a failure of replication, but one more of 
the values, perfectly compatible with a typical distribution of 
effects. Likewise, some synthesis studies have shown that a 
non-negligible part of the variability observed in the results 
can be explained by variations in the methods, designs and 
other methodological aspects (e.g., Lipsey & Wilson, 1993). 
 
A sample of problematic aspects 
 
The image that the mirror returns when observing what me-
ta-analyses show us about methodological practices has many 
faces and not all are positive. We highlight here only some of 
them, those that seem most relevant for our argument. 
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(a) High heterogeneity in the results. The persistent observa-
tion of this heterogeneity reveals one of the main challenges 
of psychology. In meta-analysis the estimated variance of 
true effects or specific variance, is represented by τ2. It is not 
the square of the standard error, which would be the error of 
estimation of the value corresponding to the mean effect 
size. Rather, it is the parametric variance of the effects. For 
example, suppose that we are going to do an intervention 
that consists of students’ self-assessment throughout some 
course. We assess its effect by comparing the academic per-
formance with those of a control group that does not self-
assess their performance. We can think that the impact of 
this intervention is a concrete value, which could be speci-
fied in terms of Cohen's d index (standardized mean differ-
ence). Actually, the true parametric value is δ, while with the 
data of the study we obtain an estimate of it, d. If we collect 
k independent estimates from independent studies and com-
bine them meta-analytically the calculated value, d• , is the 
most efficient estimate of the parametric value. However, 
what we have learned is that the variability observed in the 
values of d often exceeds that which would be expected as a 
consequence of the mere sampling of individuals. Even tak-
ing into account some moderating variables that we have 
been able to identify as moderators of the effect, there is still 
too much heterogeneity. The conclusion is obvious. As 
much as we attempt to operationalize the interventions, there 
are always unforeseen factors that modify their real paramet-
ric value. Surely, the intervention carried out does not have 
the same effect according to the teachers' experiences, their 
personalities, the cultural contexts of the schools, the per-
sonal history of the participants, and many other factors that 
we are not able to identify. That is, we must accept that the 
effects of our interventions have a variable component that 
cannot be ignored. In fact, today random-effects models are 
routinely employed in meta-analyses, the kinds of models in 
which this characteristic is assumed (Borenstein, Hedges, 
Higgins & Rothstein, 2010, Botella & Sánchez-Meca, 2015). 
But let's see how important such heterogeneity can be. 
The square root of τ2 is the standard deviation of these ef-
fects. It allows us to calculate the coefficient of variation 
(CV; Botella, Suero & Ximénez, 2012), which is defined as 
 
( _ _ ) 100CV mean effect size=   
High values indicate that the variability is very large with 
respect to the average effect. Figure 1 shows two cases with 
normal distributions (mean effect size = 1). In A, the stand-
ard deviation of the effects is equal to a quarter of the effect 
size (CV = 25), while in B, it equals half (CV = 50). In the 
first case, it must be interpreted that in any future study, it 
should be expected (with probability around .95) a paramet-
ric effect size between 0.50 and 1.50. In the second, the ef-
fect size would be in the range between 0 and 2. Many meta-
analyses in the field of educational psychology indicate that 
the CV values in the examples shown in the figure are not 
uncommon. This means that although the size of the ex-
pected parametric effect is equal to 1, a relatively large value, 
we cannot rule out that in our next self-assessment interven-
tion the effect will be much smaller. In other words, when 
we use a certain educational intervention, we cannot guarantee 
an impact reasonably close to the mean effect estimated in the meta-
analysis. 
 
Figure 1. Hypothetical distributions of parametric effect sizes of a given in-
tervention with a large mean effect size (1). Curve A shows a distribution 
with medium heterogeneity, whereas that of curve B shows a large hetero-
geneity. 
 
Our interventions are influenced by a great variety of un-
known or uncontrollable factors (Botella & Zamora, 2017). 
Our constructs are often poorly defined and our object of 
study is subject to multiple causalities, isolated and interact-
ing with others. We already suspected this and are willing to 
accept that our discipline works this way, and that behind the 
reported main effect we will always have to attach a catalog 
of moderating factors. However, we still have doubts about 
whether this heterogeneity also reveals methodological arti-
facts that we could control and reduce. 
(b) A clear publication bias favors studies with statistically 
significant results and is a classic case in the study of the ex-
ternal circumstances that influence the development of sci-
ence. We have long known that the preference for publishing 
statistically significant results ends up resulting in an excess 
of these values (Bakker, Dijk & Wicherts 2012, Ioannidis & 
Trikalinos, 2007, Sterling, Rosenbaum & Weinkam, 1995). 
The consequence is that the synthesis of the available (pub-
lished) results produces effect sizes that are overestimated. 
We have empirical evidence of that in integration studies, 
such as Lipsey and Wilson (1993), who compared published 
and unpublished studies, and also in funnel plots and in oth-
er sources. The evidence is overwhelming that publication 
bias has a major impact. The most extreme case is that in 
which the distribution of published effects, with an appre-
ciable average effect, is no more than the visible part of a 
mostly hidden iceberg. As an example, in figure 2 we can see 
on the left an empirical distribution of published d values 
(visible) with an average value around 0.60. This distribution 
presents us with a very different idea from that which would 
be conveyed by the complete distribution, which appears on 
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the right, with an average value equal to 0. In this, what was 
hidden (not published) has been made visible. 
 
 
Figure 2. An extreme case of publication bias. Panel A shows the small 
sample of studies published, all with moderate to high values of effect size 
(and probably all statistically significant). Panel B shows the complete dis-
tribution of values. The black zone in figure B shows the “visible” (pub-
lished) part of a kind of iceberg, whereas the white zone is the “invisible” 
(unpublished) part. 
 
Meta-analysis has attempted to deal with the problem of 
publication bias practically from the beginning, providing 
tools designed to assess its impact and trying to correct its 
consequences (Rosenthal, 1979, Rothstein, Sutton & Boren-
stein, 2005). This effort has led many researchers to believe 
that publication bias is a specific problem of meta-analysis, 
but actually it is not. It is a problem for anyone who wants to 
get an idea of the "state of the art" regarding any scientific 
question. Taking what is published as the source, one will 
have a biased idea of the extent to which what is published 
(or accessible) is a true sample of the evidence provided by 
the studies conducted. 
(c) A clearly suboptimal methodological quality in the aver-
age of the published studies. In many meta-analyses, statistics 
are reported regarding the methodological characteristics of 
the studies, on aspects such as randomization, the clear op-
erationalization of the manipulations, the blind evaluation, 
the analysis of the experimental mortality or attrition, the ab-
sence of pre-test comparisons, the use of reliable instru-
ments, etc. What was a suspicion became an uncomfortable 
observation: in much research, not all the methodological re-
sources available to improve the interpretability of the results 
are implemented (Klein et al., 2012). The great variety ob-
served in the methodological quality of the studies has led to 
suspicions that part of the heterogeneity of the results is due 
to the fact that the quality of many studies is low, or at least 
is very heterogeneous. A positive consequence of these re-
sults has been an attempt to develop quality scales of primary 
studies (Botella & Sánchez-Meca, 2015). The concern about 
what the meta-analyses reveal regarding this aspect is leading 
to pay more attention to how the primary studies are carried 
out and published. 
(d) An excessive presence of questionable practices, some-
thing that had become an open secret (John, Loewenstein & 
Prelec, 2012). The motivation to obtain and publish statisti-
cally significant results has led to opportunistic behaviors 
(DeCoster, Sparks, Sparks, Sparks & Sparks, 2015). Ques-
tionable practices include the elimination of atypical partici-
pants without an explicit criterion; the statistical analysis with 
incomplete data and the decision to add more participants 
according to the results (Botella, Ximénez, Revuelta & Suero, 
2006); the use of several statistical techniques reporting only 
those that yield significant results; reporting results of anal-
yses aimed to test hypotheses raised after the results are 
known (“harking”), but presenting them as a priori objectives 
(“sharking”; Hollenbeck & Wright, 2017); the analysis of 
multiple dependent variables reporting only the significant 
ones, etc. This set of practices has led to an obvious excess 
of significant results in the scientific journals (Ioannidis, 
2005; Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007). Some practices of scien-
tists have become a problem for the development of science. 
Their personal objectives interfere with those of science, and 
their opportunistic practices generate noise. 
 
The crisis of confidence: an almost unavoida-
ble consequence 
 
The reporting of bad news finally caused a crisis. In psychol-
ogy it has come to be called crisis of confidence (Earp & 
Trafimow, 2015), and we cannot say that the crisis has yet 
been overcome. The crisis of confidence has had as its main 
axis the difficulties, apparently excessive, to reproduce the 
effects that form the bases of our models (Baker, 2016; OSC, 
2015; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012; Yong, 2012). We be-
lieve that the debate on reproducibility has helped to a better 
understanding of what effect size means and its role in theo-
ry development. On the one hand, some researchers have 
discovered through this debate that the failure to find a sig-
nificant result where others have found one is not an anoma-
lous result. Rather, the odd thing would be that there were 
no such cases (except when the power of the tests approach-
es 1, its ceiling value). Replicability cannot be evaluated ex-
clusively through consistency in the dichotomous decision 
on statistical significance (Pashler & Harris, 2012). Obtaining 
a natural distribution of values of the chosen index for effect 
size is a good sign, even if this distribution includes small 
(not significant) or even null or inverse values. This is what is 
expected from the meta-analytical perspective. 
However, we cannot rule out that some well-known ef-
fects are mere artifacts, due mainly to questionable practices. 
Factors external to science can have this unwanted conse-
quence. There are both internal and external factors that 
complicate the efficient development of the social sciences. 
Among the internal factors are the weaknesses of the con-
structs we manage. While we have made advances in reliabil-
ity thanks to the psychometric and assessment developments 
of the last three decades, we still have difficulties in defining 
measures with high validity (e.g., the difficulties to define the 
concept of complexity; Arend, Colom, Botella, Contreras, 
Rubio & Santacreu, 2003). Sometimes it is said that if we do 
not measure what is important we will end up giving im-
portance to what we measure. We suspect that something 
like this happens in our discipline, in which we often have 
the feeling that we miss crucial elements that we cannot cap-
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ture with our instruments. We have a lot of work to do in 
order to get coefficients of variation that make the effects of 
our interventions more predictable. 
Among the external factors, not related to the contents of 
science itself, some are shared by most disciplines, such as 
conflicts of interests with organizations which give financial 
support to specific research programs and, therefore, are 
concerned by the results obtained, or the pressure for re-
searchers to publish. Regarding this last factor, the healthy 
idea that it is necessary to evaluate the quality of the work of 
researchers is having as a consequence the pressure on 
productivity. That pressure is clearly visible above all 
through the publication of results in scientific journals. 
Whereas in the past novel findings of theoretical interest 
were necessary ingredients for publication, now it is neces-
sary for researchers to publish in order to continue an aca-
demic career, through economic incentives (e.g., the Spanish 
“sexenios”) or promotion requirements (e.g., accreditations). 
This pressure has notably increased the presence of the ques-
tionable practices mentioned above, through the promotion 
of opportunism (DeCoster, Sparks, Sparks, Sparks & Sparks, 
2015). The confluence between this pressure and the fascina-
tion with low p values has led to practices that are exclusively 
designed to maximize the probability of obtaining a p value 
below α. Many investigations, including some meta-analyses, 
are done because they are easy to carry out and publish, 
without contributing anything really new (Ioannidis, 2016). 
Often that apparent uselessness is masked with tricks that al-
low papers to be entered into the desired journals. The tricks 
usually include methods designed to produce statistically sig-
nificant results (Lash, 2017). 
The combination of these two groups of factors has led 
to a situation that could be interpreted as a real scientific 
bubble. From the meta-analytical perspective, this is not nec-
essarily true. We believe that replication is not useless. It 
provides new data and evidence. Any repetition of a study is 
welcome. Even if research provides only new data for an es-
tablished phenomenon, it can strengthen the body of evi-
dence and facilitate building of a more complete theory of 
what we are studying. Our main tool is an estimate of the 
true distribution of effect sizes. 
 
Looking at the future 
 
What has been said so far might well transmit a more nega-
tive image than we actually have. It is true that psychology 
has already suffered several notable crises in the last century, 
about one every 20 years, from which no agreed and defini-
tive answers emerged, but which show a curious regularity. 
Perhaps they are only peaks in the oscillations of a perma-
nent crisis. It may be that living in crisis is in the nature of 
our discipline. It may be that each generation has to go 
through a crisis to lose its innocence. However, even at the 
risk of being naive we want to believe that from the current 
one, also 20 years later, something good can result, so we will 
point out some suggestions for the future that might help us 
to enter a new, more productive era. 
First of all, we believe that progress involves changing 
from a competitive to a cooperative perspective. The implicit 
script of scientific success is to publish articles with ideas 
that change our way of thinking about an issue, having a de-
cisive influence on their development (Giner-Sorolla, 2012). 
But this is only carried out by a small minority of scientists. 
Most of us simply collaborate, contributing with relevant ev-
idence that develops the current theories and models. That is 
why it is convenient to think of our study as just another one 
that contributes to a collective task from which important re-
sults will only be seen over the years and after the accumula-
tion of abundant and varied evidence. However, that change 
of perspective can only occur if there is an alignment be-
tween the objectives of science and the individual motiva-
tions of scientists. If the scientific community only values the 
contributions that involve revolution and not those that im-
ply mere evolution (Ioannidis, 2016), scientists will try to 
publish crucial studies intended to play the role of significant 
steps. For this goal, many will not hesitate to employ ques-
tionable practices that end up distorting the evidence with 
which we build our knowledge. It is necessary that perform-
ing non-novel studies is attractive, making replication a valu-
able, honest and necessary work in itself, and not simply as 
an opportunity to publish and improve one’s personal cur-
riculum (Makel, Plucker & Hegarty, 2012; Nosek, Spies & 
Motyl, 2012). 
Secondly, the change of perspective requires the imple-
mentation of practical instruments that favor the realization 
and publication of replicas that lead to results that produce 
evolution. Initiatives such as the Registered Replication Reports 
(RRR) are examples to follow (e.g., Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 
2016). These initiatives begin by launching an open call to 
replicate a certain effect under a strict protocol. Several la-
boratories or research groups respond to this call. Only pre-
registered studies will be taken into account, and their au-
thors commit themselves to contribute their results, whether 
or not they are significant. Therefore, bases of studies are 
formed free of publication bias. The techniques usually used 
to analyze the evidence produced in the RRR are those from 
meta-analysis (Blázquez, Botella & Suero, 2017). Once con-
siderable progress has been made in the synthesis of the evi-
dence published to date spontaneously, through retrospec-
tive meta-analysis, the time comes to design, program and 
perform prospective meta-analyses. These are genuine re-
search programs based on cooperation among groups of sci-
entists. In fact, the idea of the prospective meta-analysis is 
aligned with the recommendations made to improve the 
general reproducibility of the methods used in the quantita-
tive synthesis. These recommendations include the previous 
registration, but also follow some information standards and 
share openly the data, making them available to other re-
searchers (Lakens, Hilgard, & Staaks, 2016). 
Finally, we must maintain constant feedback of scientific 
practices, by including the methodological aspects in the me-
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ta-analyses. This healthy habit will allow us to identify ques-
tionable practices, maintain the methodological requirements 
and develop strategies to improve and to compensate for 
them. 
 
Conclusions 
 
It is time to return to the starting point. What can we say 
about meta-analysis 40 years later? In the first place, it has 
been consolidated as a methodology for the synthesis of sci-
entific evidence and the analysis of heterogeneity of results. 
Second, the techniques have evolved and have become con-
siderably more sophisticated, reaching a high degree of ro-
bustness and efficiency (e.g., Botella, Sepúlveda, Huang, & 
Gambara, 2013). Third, it has acquired an added function, 
not foreseen at birth, which refers to the supervision and 
analysis of scientific practices. The techniques have become 
essential tools to make an empirical study of the scientific 
practices themselves. Meta-analyses can detect anomalies, di-
agnose their origin and introduce elements with which to 
correct them. The paradigmatic example is publication bias, 
but other questionable practices can be approached from 
similar perspectives. 
Fourth, we can envision the possibility of turning a prob-
lem into an opportunity if we adopt the meta-analytical per-
spective. The need to publish impressive results, with high 
levels of statistical significance, leads to sending reports to 
journals in which the results are forced and disguised as rev-
olutionary when in fact they must be considered as being 
evolutionary. These trends have led to what looks like a sci-
entific bubble. Nevertheless, maybe we can reconvert it if we 
change the perspective. The proliferation of scientific publi-
cations need not be a problem for science. If we accept that 
we need exhaustive replications we have to facilitate their re-
alizations and publication, recognizing it as merit where the 
scientists need it (Koole & Lakens, 2012). We must attune 
the objectives of scientists as individuals with those of sci-
ence as a collective task. We can take the symptoms of the 
scientific bubble as a propitious occasion in the progress of 
knowledge construction. Meta-analysis has taught us that we 
cannot make a complete idea of any effect with a single 
study or with a very few. We need a critical mass of repeti-
tions. We can turn the problem of pressure into publishing 
into an opportunity for systematic replication. 
Even so, we must be aware that facing the alleged bubble 
does not solve the main underlying problem: the methodo-
logical and epistemological weakness of the behavioral sci-
ences (Schmidt & Oh, 2016). We have to accept, simply, that 
our methodology is weak, learning to coexist with the uncer-
tainty and ambiguity that it entails. In return, we can organize 
ourselves to conducting mass replications when useful or 
necessary. If we take advantage of the pressure to publish to 
launch projects of systematic repetitions of studies, we can 
end up transforming a problem into an opportunity. Observ-
ing the impact of works such as Hattie's (2009) on what 
counts in learning, we realize how small each individual re-
search contribution is and how unimportant the results of 
most of them are when we look at them in perspective. 
To add a final word on scientific perspective, our opinion 
is that we should not give in to the temptation to abandon 
rigor and exigency in the face of what seem to be excessive 
difficulties in reproducing any phenomenon. The verification 
of weaknesses in our discipline must have the effect of rein-
forcing the efforts to make psychology a credible science. 
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